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Introduction
In 2014, the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (numsa), one of 
the most historically militant, largest and powerful unions in the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (cosatu) was expelled from the federation. With its exit 
cosatu membership dropped from 1.9 million workers to 1.6 million. This moment 
was both a symptom and a cause of the increasing fragmentation of the once unified 
and dominant labour movement in South Africa. For a brief time it was held out 
as a renewal of trade unions, and yet, a few years on, the labour movement remains 
weak. As many have written about, the changes to the federation from its halcyon 
days of struggle to the transition to post-apartheid South Africa have multiple ex-
planations and trace out over the last twenty six years of democratic South Africa 
(Adler and Webster, 2000; Bramble and Barchiesi, 2003; Webster and von Holdt, 
2005; Buhlungu, 2010; Bezuidenhout and Tshoaedi, 2017). Dynamics since the 
split continue to illustrate organizational and class compositional divisions within 
society. This paper outlines these changes. 
Debate rages among activists and academics in South Africa over the current 
status of the labour movement – whether it is ‘dead’ or being reborn in new orga-
nizational forms and/or broader class movements. There is no question, the labour 
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movement in South Africa has fragmented and is changing. Unions have lost po-
litical appeal for many, including many young workers, influence and power. They 
represent a declining population of wage workers in an economy hit by restructuring 
and retrenchments and as the so-called ‘informal sector’ has grown. 
Of the nearly 23 million people in the labour force (out of a total of 38.4 million 
people between the ages of 15 and 64), 48.6% are in formal sector jobs, 13.2% in 
the informal sector, 3.6% in agriculture and 5.4% in private households. The latter 
two categories represent categories that are de jure (by law) ‘formal’ jobs in terms 
of legislative coverage, but de facto are often highly precarianized work subjected 
to forms of apartheid-era racial subjugation. The official unemployment rate now 
stands at 29%, not including discouraged work seekers, which are another 7% of 
the working age population (putting the ‘expanded’ unemployment rate at 36%) 
(Statssa, 2019). Within the working population, conditions have stagnated or de-
clined and wages have not increased in the two decades following 1994 (Barchiesi, 
2011; Theron, 2005; Kenny and Webster, 1998; Gentle, 2015; Webster and Frances, 
2019). Increasing unemployment and wider household precariousness extend the 
effects of changes to wage labour broadly to most South Africans (Fakier and Cock, 
2009; Bezuidenhout and Fakier, 2006; Mosoetsa, 2011; Benya, 2015; Marais, 2020). 
Indeed, most households in South Africa rely on a diverse and shifting membership 
and source of contributions, including state grants, informal livelihoods and wage 
labour (Mosoetsa, 2011; Scully, 2016). In general in the post-apartheid period, in 
the poorest households, wages account for a relatively small proportion of over-
all income, although consequently when present, wages help to determine basic 
household stability (Finn, 2015). Thus, unions relate to a declining population of 
working people, while the relative importance of wages remains high in such circuits 
of relation (Kenny, 2018). 
Conditions producing economic vulnerability indeed bind precarious jobs to 
commodification and declining access to public services (Naidoo, 2009; Barchiesi, 
2011). A complex mix of social movements have pushed back against neoliberal 
onslaught in South Africa over the past two decades, including the labour move-
ment, sometimes working together but often not (Naidoo and Veriava, 2005; Desai, 
2002). Nevertheless, much of the resilience of working class movements in South 
Africa must be attributed to the clear sense in which “subjects-in-struggle” (Hall, 
1985, p. 112) regenerate through the very reproduction of race-class relations in 
ways that continue to imbricate wage workers in these efforts. Despite growing 
precariousness, increasing ‘wagelessness’, and disconnection of ordinary people 
from union structures, working people have continued to articulate a collective 
political subjectivity of ‘workers’, or in the isiZulu collective noun form, abasebenzi 
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(Kenny, 2018). This historical and evolving political subjectivity remains emotively 
resonant in the face of sustained attacks against workers. This suggests that histori-
cally situated relations underpinning movements, in this case, the enduring power 
and meaning of collective worker identity to ordinary South African workers, itself 
offers a resource, even as global events like the financial crisis intertwine with local 
conditions to exacerbate challenges. 
The 2008 global financial crisis affected the South African economy, although 
initially South Africa seemed to stay off the worst effects of the financial crisis. For 
instance, South Africa’s banking sector had maintained better leverage than the big 
US and European banks, at 16% average leverage (debt to equity ratio) compared to 
from 35% to up to 50-60% for the big global investment banks (Padayachee, 2012, 
p. 7). South African banks had already taken measures to improve their capital ra-
tios before the crisis and local regulation of the banking industry meant that due to 
restrictions of exchange control banks could not invest in the forms of “toxic asset 
floating” as in other contexts. They were also required to increase their capital ratios, 
which were raised when banks granting loans of greater than 80% of a property’s 
value, which limited banks from loaning indiscriminately as elsewhere (Padayachee, 
2012, p. 8). Still, credit risk ratios got worse after 2008, growth in credit fell, and 
local banks’ earnings were affected (Padayachee, 2012, pp. 9-10). 
More directly, by early 2009, the country went into recession for the first time 
since the late 1980s, and large job losses of nearly a million jobs in 2009, particularly 
in manufacturing, hit the country (Padayachee, 2012)1. 
South African macroeconomic policy revolved around its ‘home spun structural 
adjustment program’, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (gear) frame-
work, which forced balances within imf norms. South Africa maintained increases in 
rates of economic growth (although not as high as expected), kept inflation within 
its target of 3-6% (for the most part), and budget deficit was controlled before 2007 
(Padayachee, 2012, p. 3). By the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, South Africa’s 
growth rate fell to 1.8% and then the economy fell into recession. By the second 
quarter of 2009 it was at -3.2% (Padayachee, 2012, p. 3). Manufacturing output 
declined by 6.8%; mining production declined by 12.8% between first quarter 2008 
and the same period 2009. Inflation increased, and the cpix reached an average of 
9.9% in 2008 (Padayachee, 2012, p. 4).
South Africa is relatively open to the global economy, and has been, of course, 
historically. The global financial crisis weakened the value of the currency. After 
1. Available at https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Job-losses-to-exceed-a-million-20091029, accessed 
15/2/2020.
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2009 gdp recovered partly related to an upturn in the commodity cycle, eventually 
reaching growth of 3% again, which then ended in 2014 with mineral prices, seeing 
a decline again in growth rates in South Africa to less than 2% thereafter (Kantor, 
2018). Padayachee (2012) argues that the main effect of the financial crisis on South 
and Southern Africa was the slowdown in foreign financial inflows coupled with 
the region’s reliance on commodity based export growth. 
The South African state’s response to the financial crisis was initially to keep up 
spending on physical investment, including roads, power stations, housing, and in 
2010, its hosting of the fifa World Cup. This coincided with the shift in anc factions 
in power from the explicit neoliberals of the Thabo Mbeki era to the win by Jacob 
Zuma (backed by the Communist Party and cosatu) meant to be a left shift in late 
2007 as head of the anc, with Zuma taking over as state president in late 2008. The 
local political dynamics intertwining with the wake of global financial crisis makes 
the national terrain complex. Zuma ended up representing a new kleptocratic elite, 
which used state owned enterprises for personal gain, siphoning billions of Rands 
out of state coffers. At the same time, the finance policy continued along similar 
lines as can been seen in the National Developmenet Plan (ndp), launched at the 
anc 2012 Policy Conference. Indeed, Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013, p. 538) argue 
that there has been a “neoliberal deepening” in the transition from Mbeki to Zuma 
and in the post-2008 financial crisis period. 
The neoliberalism of anc policy has been charted under Mbeki (see Segatti and 
Pons-Vignon, 2013 for summary; and see Freund, 2013). By 1993, the anc had 
decisively chosen an export-oriented growth strategy and opened up to privatization 
(Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013, p. 544). This policy orientation was consolidated 
under gear. After 2008, the anc adopted two economic policy frameworks, the 
New Growth Path and the National Development Plan. The dominance of the 
National Treasury continued in both these documents. The New Growth Path, for 
instance, did not offer any further controls over financial capital (and capital flight) 
that had defined a structural shift in South Africa’s economy in the post-apartheid 
period (Ashman, Fine and Newman, 2011; Fine, 2012; Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 
2013, p. 546). The National Development Plan rearticulated a trickle down macro-
economic framework, focused on export-led growth and foreign direct investment.
While certainly the forms of neoliberalism, conjoined in South Africa with 
democratization and the entrenching of a national and, in some ways, nativist 
bourgeoisie, have meant that the race-class project of post-apartheid South Africa 
has played out through deep contradictions (Hart, 2008; 2013; Von Holdt, 2019), 
everyday struggles and organization of working class people on the ground continues. 
These are pessimistic times, but in fragmentation and contradiction reside possibility. 
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Post-apartheid problems
Let us return to the ‘numsa moment’. In early November of 2014 the cosatu 
Central Executive Committee (cec) expelled one of its founding unions, numsa. 
The decision was taken by union officials and not at a congress of elected worker 
representatives, as would have been the procedure (Bezuidenhout and Tshoaedi, 
2017, pp. 1-2). The cec decision to expel its largest affiliate followed a numsa 
resolution at its own congress in 2013 not to support the African National Con-
gress (anc) in general elections in 2014, counter to cosatu’s constitution (Pillay, 
2017; Satgar and Southall, 2015; Gentle, 2015; Hunter, 2014). numsa members 
had decided that the anc no longer represented the interests of the working class 
(numsa, 2014; Pillay, 2017). The faction within cosatu bound to Zuma and the 
anc hit back (Gentle, 2015). 
The fault line split over longer term disagreement, though, about the Tripartite 
Alliance of cosatu with the ruling anc and South African Communist Party 
(sacp), which had formed in the early 1990s in the lead up to the first democratic 
election in 1994. These already-existing political debates were exacerbated with the 
Marikana Massacre in 2012 in which 34 striking mineworkers were killed by police, 
shot with live ammunition, while undertaking a protracted labour action around 
pay, followed by similar police aggression against striking farmworkers in 2012 and 
20132. In 2015 the General Secretary of cosatu Zwelinzima Vavi was suspended, 
after sexual harassment allegations were leveled against him, and then dismissed. 
Those within the federation critical of the Alliance understood this as a political 
move to remove him (Gentle, 2015). 
The expulsion of numsa from the federation marked a watershed moment in 
the history of organized labour in South Africa. numsa went on to form a new 
federation, the South African Federation of Trade Unions (saftu) in 2017, on the 
principle of independent socialism, with Vavi at its helm, and with other unions, such 
as the Food and Allied Workers Union, which left cosatu in the wake of numsa’s 
expulsion. The once dominant trade union federation cosatu lost members and 
legitimacy in these political battles (Bezuidenthout and Tshoaedi, 2017; Satgar and 
Southall, 2015; Gentle, 2015). 
The left split from cosatu with the creation of saftu for a time held some 
hope of union political renewal, but sectarianism in the context of ongoing national 
2. The symbolism of the mass killing, visually replicating apartheid-era patterns, sent ripples throughout 
the world. The National Union of Mineworkers, a core affiliate within cosatu, defended police deci-
sion-making. cosatu was slow to condemn the event, tied up as it was within anc power politics.
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fractional politics has plagued these structures too (Moussouris, 2017; Pillay, 2017)3. 
These political upheavals were symptomatic of deeper contradictions surfacing in 
the post-apartheid period. How did we get here? 
Prominent sociologist (and former trade unionist) Buhlungu (2010) had already 
warned cosatu of tensions between winning democratic labour rights, trade union 
bureaucratization and the effects of neoliberalism, in what he called a ‘paradox of 
victory’ (and see Buhlungu in Adler and Webster, 2000). Under apartheid, the 
black working class organized into unions at the workplace, which also confronted 
authoritarian rule of the apartheid state. This unified workers into a larger politi-
cal struggle and made for a militant labour movement (Seidman, 1994). Gaining 
institutional hold in legal protections and in statutory forums in post-apartheid 
South Africa offered protections to some workers (see Adler and Webster, 1995), 
especially those most secure, but also has meant many unions lost connection to the 
shop floor, as struggles there became technicist and complex issues of work orga-
nization occurred at the level of centralized industry bargaining in many instances 
(Buhlungu 2010; Masondo, 2012). 
Under apartheid, South African independent unions had championed worker 
control which set standards for union participation and democracy through regular 
meetings, decision-making structures and mandates. Much of these traditions have 
been undermined through the ways unions and officials in the post-apartheid period 
became involved in more technical restructuring decisions at higher levels; skilled 
union officials went to government or business; in turn, union officials have in some 
cases used positions for career advancement; and, some unions have been involved 
with direct corruption scandals, including involving union investment funds set up 
after 1994 (Masondo, 2012; Mabasa, 2017, p. 7-8; Gentle, 2015). With a shift from 
mobilization and mass action of the labour movement under apartheid, or what was 
called ‘ungovernability’, toward institutionalization, there opened a gap between 
union leadership and membership, in general then (Buhlungu 2010; Buhlungu and 
Tshoaedi, 2012). This has occurred along with the decline in trade union education 
of rank-and-file members, which has meant less involvement and understanding 
from workers with policy-making taking place through “elites” in the movement 
and officials (Bezuidenhout and Tshoaedi, 2017, p. 5; Hlatshwayo, 2019). General-
ized poor servicing of members has also led to disaffection with unions (Buhlungu 
and Tshoaedi, 2012; Gentle, 2015; Dickinson, 2017; Webster and Englert, 2020). 
3. In the 2018 national elections, saftu formed the Socialist Workers Revolutionary Party, but garnered 
very poor numbers and did not win even one seat in Parliament.
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The optimism of the ‘transition’ was critiqued at the time by left academics (see 
the contributions to Bramble and Barchiesi, 2003). Democracy as a context of nego-
tiated agreement and institutional leverage fairly quickly was undermined through 
the non-negotiation of a clearly neoliberal framework of state macrofinance, the 
Growth Employment and Redistribution (gear) programme (Marais, 1998; Satgar 
and Southall, 2015). cosatu protested gear on the streets and eventually made a 
pact to push then anc and national president Mbeki out and bring in Zuma. The 
Alliance was already generating problems by the 1990s. The ‘Polokwane moment’, 
or simply ‘Polokwane’, named after the city in which the anc conference overthrew 
Mbeki for Zuma, would not bring the relief against neoliberalism hoped for. Indeed, 
Zuma would entrench elite accumulation through corruption using state enterprises 
for more than a decade, in which state tenders were awarded to various looters in 
exchange for pay outs to politicians and relatives, in what has become called ‘State 
Capture’ in South Africa4. He was eventually replaced in party structures in late 
2018 with Ramaphosa, the former deputy president, after another bruising politi-
cal battle, which still plays itself out in the state and as elite interests reconfigure, 
austerity measures ratchet up, and in the face of deepening economic crisis (Von 
Holdt, 2019). cosatu’s alliance politics played out on the national stage, then, as 
these power struggles absorbed leadership.
Changes to the economy and labour market since 1994 have also posed stark 
challenges to the labour movement. Some divisions, for instance between urban 
and rural workers have persisted (Xulu, 2012), and new divisions within the labour 
market have created new fissures among workers (Kenny and Webster, 1998; Kenny, 
2018). First, categories of precarious labour have increased, and trade unions have 
been unable or unwilling to organize and represent them. As an indication of the 
changes to class composition of the unions, the majority of federation members 
shifted from the private sector to the public sector over the past twenty years and 
from lower skilled to higher skilled workers. They more likely to be fulltime workers, 
as well (Bezuidenhout and Tshoaedi, 2017). Contrasting the membership to labour 
market trends thus indicates the incapacities of unions to organize contract, casual, 
flexitime workers, as many have shown (Kenny, 2018; Barchiesi, 2011; Benjamin, 
2014; Theron, 2005; Kenny and Webster, 1998; Clarke, 2004; Bezuidenhout and 
Fakier, 2006; Kenny and Bezuidenhout, 1999; Webster and Englert, 2020). In 
general unions responses to the effects of precarianization of labour, retrenchments, 
and restructuring were defensive and did not result in many wins for supporting 
workers worst hit. These changes to working class composition wrought through 
4. Indeed, Vavi would apologize to the nation for backing Zuma. 
125Jan.-Apr.   2020
Bridget Kenny
decades of capital restructuring, offshoring and downsizing, then, without genera-
tive rethinking by unions have altered the political terrain in ways that many argue 
make old union structures obsolete. 
‘New’ forms of working class and worker organization
A sustained critique of trade unions and models of organizing has dominated la-
bour sociology in South Africa. There has been focus on ‘new’ social movements 
around commodification of public services, which was seen as a shift from labour 
politics, and befitting changing working class composition (Naidoo and Veriava, 
2005; Desai, 2002; Levenson, 2017; Paret, 2018; Alexander, 2010). Indeed, Scully 
(2016) argues that the site of ‘reproduction’ is more apt ground for politics than 
cite of production under conditions of precarity, as declining wage income should 
predict that working class people battle around matters related to households. There 
have also been a range of studies conducted on ‘new’ worker organizing, including 
new formations outside of existing unions by precarious workers (see Desai, 2002; 
Kenny, 2007, 2011, 2018; Sinwell, 2015, 2016; Wilderman, 2014; Dickinson, 2017; 
Kodisang, 2018; Hlatshwayo, 2018; Runciman, 2019; Webster and Englert, 2020). 
In the wake of Marikana, scholars also returned to examining union and labour 
organizing. In fact, working class people continue to organize collectively both 
inside and outside union structures where unions have been less than responsive 
to worker demands. Some examples are offered below. 
Hlatshwayo (2018, p. 3), for instance, argues that labour studies has focused on 
examining formal trade unions in South Africa but attention to other “organizational 
responses to precariousness” may offer signs of enduring mobilization in less visible 
forms. For instance, he examines community health care workers, who offer palliative 
care for sick residents. Community health workers are registered with the state and 
sometimes work for ngos. They receive state subsidies for their work, which was 
initially understood to be ‘voluntary’, as the need for health care workers in poor 
communities was compounded by austerity and shortages among employed public 
nursing staff (Hlatshwayo, 2018, p. 5). Many health care workers are women. They 
organized outside of public sector health unions and often with the assistance of 
left ngos to push legal cases, to establish their status as ‘employees’, and to improve 
wages and conditions (and see Kodisang, 2012). 
Webster and Englert argue that there are new opportunities for organizing 
emerging out of precariousness. They suggest that there is ‘institutional power’ cre-
ated from previous moments of labour organizing, specifically institutionalized in 
labour law. This context creates a contradiction in that established unions benefit 
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from their inclusion and protecting the status quo, while precarious workers fall 
outside of protections and substantive forms of representation. What they found 
is that subcontracted workers used organizing strategies with longer traditions in 
unions in the region in order to struggle for the incorporation of contract workers 
into permanent contracts with equitable wages and conditions. They assert that 
precarious workers are thus, “rebuilding worker organisation from below” (Webster 
and Englert, 2020, p. 2). 
Sinwell (2015, 2016) argues that alternative structures, like workers’ committees 
sustained the platinum mining strikes. The committees fed into newer unions, as 
well, that split off from the num. I have argued that labour politics of retail work-
ers in greater Johannesburg has endured because of longer histories of race-class 
relations in employment relations, which have reproduced the site of the labour 
relation as linked to personhood and belonging, even as, and indeed because of 
how precariousness has constantly shifted the terms of ‘inclusion’ (Kenny, 2018). 
Retail workers with whom I worked for more than two decades have regularly 
challenged their union and formed other structures at shop floor level to contest 
conditions, including treatment by other workers. The ways that these politics have 
carried out has also, though, produced new divisions and contradictions. These are 
not static fields: why workers return to labour politics especially in the context of 
growing household vulnerability involves deeper histories that studies of examples 
of organizing, as ‘successful’ cases, often do not take into consideration because 
such a focus relies on demonstrating the factors accounting for success (which are 
offered as instrumental strategy), rather than engaging in the situated social relations 
explaining why and when workers act (Idem).
Finally, it should be noted that trade union membership remains significant in 
global comparison. Overall trade union membership went from 2.6 million members 
in 1997 to 3.26 million in 2013. cosatu grew from its formation in 1985 from over 
460,000 to 1.25 million in 1991, on the brink of democracy. In 2003, it had 1.76 
million members and 2.19 million in 2012 (Van der Walt, 2019, p. 24). These figures 
put nearly a third of the workforce covered by collective agreements (Mabasa, 2017, 
p. 4). Thus at cosatu congress in 2018, while its membership dropped to 1.56 mil-
lion, these losses were accounted for by losses in the National Union of Mineworkers, 
due to splits with Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (amcu) 
and to the departure of numsa with its 338,000 members and fawu (with 120,000 
members) to form saftu with other unions. The Federation of Unions of South 
Africa (fedusa) claimed 700,000 members in 2017. The National Council of Trade 
unions (nactu) and consawu claim another nearly 300,000 members (Van der 
Walt, 2019, p. 24). There have been declines due to retrenchments and increasing 
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unemployment within the economy, but overall these membership figures suggest 
an enduring presence of trade unions. 
Important strikes, such as in the public sector, have shown that unions can bring 
members out. Public sector workers struck in 2007 under Mbeki’s presidency, an-
gered by declining wages and conditions. The cosatu unions represented a major-
ity of workers in the public sector. Soon afterwards in December 2007, Zuma was 
elected as anc President, to then become state president. Unionists had moved to 
get him into power as noted above against Mbeki’s neoliberalism. In 2010 a second 
large public sector strike broke out amongst teachers and hospital staff lasting for 
three weeks, the most person-days lost in South African history (Ceruti, 2010). This 
strike called on the reconfiguration within state power via the Alliance to make its 
wage demands. Instead, the police came out with rubber bullets and water cannons. 
Ceruti analyses these strikes and argues that cosatu was caught between workers, 
who were fed up, and the terrain of national politics being fought out within the 
Alliance. In short, workers (and union members) mobilized even within these ten-
sions. The platinum belt strikes, of which Marikana was the bloody finale of one 
strike, and those following, show the resilience and persistence of unionized workers 
to contest their conditions within the current political conjuncture (Sinwell, 2016). 
Indeed, even internal to cosatu, critiques have been leveled of the “crisis” of 
the labour movement (Mabasa, 2017, p. 1). Commonly this critique lays blame at 
the foot of government policy, located within tendencies within the state, as with 
Mbeki, or with the ‘global economy’. Regardless of the immediate cause, many 
unionists identify contradictions thrown up in terms of global capital, labour market 
precarianization, increasing unemployment, declining wages, etc., and work within 
massive constraints to produce some gains ( Jacobs, 2019; Rees, 2018). The dual role 
seen by cosatu activists of engaging in state developmental policy and representing 
workers clearly has produced tensions (see Mabasa, 2017, p. 3; and see Maserumule, 
forthcoming). Despite criticism of cosatu, there has been federation debate on 
the inadequacies of organizing segments of precarious workers. Precisely because of 
these changes to the balance of class forces, however, unions often turned defensive, 
and work to protect their numbers and clout (Mabasa, 2017). 
Runciman argues that cosatu traded its ‘institutional power’ against working 
class interests, in particular citing its negotiations around labour law reform since 
the first democratic reform in 1995, and culminating in labour law reform in 2019, 
which restricts the right to strike through technical means.5 She reports “declining” 
5. The Labour Relations Act of 1995 introduced national labour rights, including the right to strike, to free 
association and to fair procedure and defined these in relation to a wider definition of employee, bringing 
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working days lost due to strikes over the past decade (Runciman, 2019, p. 148), 
despite fairly dramatic peaks in 2007, 2010 and 2014 with large strikes. Indeed, 
organized labour, as this brief history shows, has faced serious contradictions in its 
Alliance with the ruling party, which is in turn, embedded within South Africa’s 
particular structural relations of racial capitalism fuelled by the entre of a (black) 
national bourgeoisie as global capital expanded. These are the particularities of the 
contradictions facing South Africa. What is significant, however, is that the critique 
of cosatu from working class and poor South Africans outside of its membership 
as well as ordinary workers within its membership has been vocal, and at times, has 
indeed spurned mass action, splits and new organizations. Thus, when workers have 
left cosatu affiliates, they have joined other unions, either through breakaways, or 
through new formations, what Sinwell calls in the context of the platinum sector 
“insurgent trade unionism” (Sinwell, 2015), where workers’ committee struggles 
among platinum workers operated in critique of num, independently and later in 
relation to amcu. While the outlook is pessimistic in many ways, the broader labour 
movement remains dynamic.
Conclusion
In the context of tightening austerity in the wake of the intertwining effects of the 
global economy with the Zuma ‘State Capture’ years, conditions in South Africa’s 
economy are set to worsen over the short to medium term (Amandla! Editorial 
Team, 2019). Some argue that existing unions are too compromised by national and 
nationalist politics, with its underbelly of cronyism, to offer any real answers to the 
working class and poor majority in South Africa. Some see new forms of worker 
organizing as evidence of the nascent new movement corresponding to changes 
to class formation. Often these forms draw on longer South African traditions 
of workplace organizing, centred on labour rights, but in general shift away from 
industrial unions. Still others find the labour movement itself represents a minor-
ity – some even say a labour aristocracy. The combination of national politics with 
global capital restructuring at a moment of nationalist recentring starkly exposes 
the contradictions at play in South Africa over the past decade (Hart, 2013; Kenny, 
2019). While fewer and fewer people are in formal employment, and the relations 
within jobs reproduce forms of racial abjection, inducing fraying attachments to the 
new categories of workers under one regulation. Some argue that because of procedural rules required 
to activate a ‘legal’ strike, the law also has served to discipline and ‘incorporate’ trade unions and workers 
(see Adler and Webster, 1995; Adler and Webster, 2000; and see Bramble and Barchiesi, 2003).
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site of labour relations as a terrain of worthwhile political struggle (Kenny, 2018; and 
see Barchiesi, 2011), still, as I have argued, ideas of collective subjectivity abide there. 
Membership in unions remains important. Unions hold public space. New worker 
and working class organization happens. Thus, while fragmented and contradictory, 
to say that ‘workers’ as a collective political subject are obsolete ignores the multiple 
grounds on which working class people continue to struggle. 
These are likely to come from multiple directions. Efforts which engage issues of 
colonial despotism and dispossession are likely to expand (see Nkosi, 2018; Hart, 
2013; Bennie, 2019). This paper suggests that the broader landscape of the so-called 
‘new’ forms of worker organization combined with existing trade union persistence 
presents a combined and complex terrain, which while sobering, also suggests that 
rendering workers’ politics obsolete is perhaps premature. In so much as workers’ 
struggles continue to be posed as access to a site of equality and relationality within 
a long history of racial abjection, then workers’ struggles continue to draw on a 
politics of liberation. In so far as new forms of vitriolic neoliberal capitalism oper-
ate through state power, the conditions of survival will create new lines of division 
and repeat the impossibility of equality through ‘work’. The very nature of those 
actions will likely be divided.
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Abstract
The South African labour movement: A fragmented and shifting terrain
This paper reviews the state of the South African labour movement. It discusses trade unions 
within the context of national political dynamics, including the Tripartite Alliance and neo-
liberalism, as well as growing precarianization of work within South Africa. It examines splits 
within the major federation and explores debates around union renewal and new worker orga-
nizations. It argues that the political terrain is fragmented and shifting, but workers’ collective 
labour politics abides. 
Keywords: Labour movement; South Africa; cosatu; New forms of organization.
Resumo
O movimento sindical sul-africano: um terreno fragmentado e instável
Este artigo analisa o estado do movimento sindical sul-africano. Discute os sindicatos no contexto 
da dinâmica política nacional, incluindo a Aliança Tripartite e o neoliberalismo, bem como a 
crescente pré-arianização do trabalho na África do Sul. Ele examina as divisões dentro da grande 
federação e explora os debates em torno da renovação sindical e das novas organizações de traba-
lhadores. Argumenta-se que o terreno político é fragmentado e instável, mas a política coletiva 
de trabalho dos trabalhadores permanece.
Palavras-chave: Movimento sindical; África do Sul; cosatu; Novas formas de organização.
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